Assurance cases provide an organized and explicit argument for correctness. They can dramatically improve the certification of Scientific Computing Software (SCS). Assurance cases have already been effectively used for safety cases for real time systems. Their advantages for SCS include engaging domain experts, producing only necessary documentation, and providing evidence that can be verified/replicated. This paper illustrates assurance cases for SCS through the correctness case for 3dfim+, an existing Medical Imaging Application (MIA) for analyzing activity in the brain. This example was partly chosen because of recent concerns about the validity of fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) studies. The example justifies the value of assurance cases for SCS, since the existing documentation is shown to have ambiguities and omissions, such as an incompletely defined ranking function and missing details on the coordinate system. A serious concern for 3dfim+ is identified: running the software does not produce any warning about the necessity of using data that matches the parametric statistical model employed for the correlation calculations. Raising the bar for SCS in general, and MIA in particular, is both feasible and necessary when software impacts safety, an assurance case methodology (or an equivalently rigorous confidence building methodology) should be employed.
Introduction
Are we currently putting too much trust in the quality of Scientific Computing Software (SCS)? For instance, for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), concerns exist with respect to the statistical analysis models commonly employed [28, 9] . Since medical professionals use the output of fMRI, and other Medical Imaging Applications (MIA), for diagnosis and treatment planning, we need to have confidence in the software. Often the developers of SCS, such as MIA, are medical physicists, scientists and engineers, not software engineers. Although SCS developers do excellent work, are there currently enough checks and balances, from a software development perspective, for confidence in correctness? The usual approach employed when correctness is critical is to impose requirements for official software certification, where the goal for certification is to: "...systematically determine, based on the principles of science, engineering and measurement theory, whether a software product satisfies accepted, well-defined and measurable criteria" [14, p. 12] . Unfortunately, five significant problems exist for SCS in general, and MIA in particular, in completing a conventional certification exercise through an external body, like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA):
1. The external body cannot rely on all their staff having deep expertise in the physical problem the software simulates or analyses, or in the numerical techniques employed. This tends to lead the external body to request a large quantity of documentation, as shown in standards for medical software [5] . 2. SCS developers tend to dislike documentation. Scientists do not view rigid, process-heavy approaches, favourably [3] . Moreover, they often consider reports for each stage of software development as counterproductive [30, p. 373 ]. Although documentation is generated when required, the normal work flow has the documentation as a "necessary evil" at the end of the process. 3. Historically when software engineers work with scientists there are challenges for communication and collaboration [19, 32] . 4. Conventional documentation (requirements, design, etc.) relies on an implicit argument for correctness; a tacit assumption is made that completing the documentation will improve quality, but no explicit argument is given to show that correctness will be a consequence of the documentation. Perhaps more important, there is no explicit recognition that adequate and effective documentation is necessary for correctness of complex software applications. 5. Verification of SCS is challenging because of the oracle problem [20] -testing is difficult because we do not always know the expected correct output for a given set of inputs.
A potential solution to these problems is to have the SCS developers create, or partially create, an assurance case before, or while they develop their software. Assurance case techniques have been developed and successfully applied for real time safety critical systems [29, 31, 50 ]. An assurance case presents an organized and explicit argument for correctness (or whatever other software quality is deemed important) through a series of sub-arguments and evidence. Putting the argument in the hands of the experts means that they will work to convince themselves, along with the regulators. They will use the expertise that the regulators may not have; they will be engaged. This engagement will hopefully help bridge the current chasm between software engineering and scientific computing [19, 46] , by motivating scientists toward documentation and correcting the problem of software engineers failing to meet scientists' expectations [33] . Significant documentation will still likely be necessary, but through assurance cases the developers now decide the content of the documentation. What is created will be relevant and necessary. More details on the current literature on assurance cases is given in Section 2.
Arguing in favour of assurance cases for SCS does not imply that SCS developers have not, or do not currently treat correctness seriously. They have developed many successful theories, techniques, testing procedures and review processes. In fact, an assurance case will likely use much of the same evidence that SCS developers currently use to convince themselves of the correctness of their software. The difference is that the argument will no longer be ad hoc, or incompletely documented. The argument will now be explicitly presented for review by third parties; we will no longer be implicitly asked to trust the developer. The act of creating the assurance case may also lead the developer to discover subtle edge cases, which would not have been noticed with a less rigorous and systematic approach. This is particularly true when testing is complicated by the lack of a test oracle. The developer needs to overcome this challenge and their solution to the problem should be open to external scrutiny.
While the eventual goal is to develop a template for assurance cases for any SCS, our initial approach is to learn by first building an assurance case for one particular example. We ask ourselves what an assurance case would look like for an MIA example, and then assess the potential value of this assurance case. Our case study focuses on 3dfim+, an MIA software package that supports Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). 3dfim+ was selected because it is a reasonably small (approximately 1700 lines of code) and easy to understand example of medical image analysis software. 3dfim+ also has the advantage that testing is straightforward, because independent implementations of the calculations exist that provide a pseudo-oracle. We targeted medical image analysis soft-ware, since some of the common fMRI statistical analyses data have not yet been validated [28] and because a recent study [9] has shown a potentially serious flaw in software commonly used to analyze fMRI data. More detail on 3dfim+ can be found in Section 3.
The scope of our work does not include redeveloping or reimplementing 3dfim+. Our goal is to build an assurance case for the existing software by treating it as black box. We consider only the executable for 3dfim+ and the existing documentation. We produce new documentation and testing results, but not new code. Excluding the code makes the case study more realistic, since, if an assurance case exercise were to be conducted in industry, there would be little appetite for reimplementation. Considerable effort has already gone into writing medical image analysis (and other scientific software); it is not feasible for the community to start over.
To argue for the correctness of 3dfim+, we developed an assurance case with the top claim of " Program 3dfim+ delivers correct outputs when used for its intended purpose in its intended environment, and within its assumed operating assumptions." Part of the explicit argument involved developing a Software Requirements Specification (SRS) document that contains all the necessary information and mathematical background needed to understand 3dfim+. This document can be used for validation and verification activities; sections of it appear many times as evidence in our assurance case. The SRS was reviewed by a domain expert as part of the assurance case evidence. We also developed a test case to illustrate how the results from 3dfim+ can be checked to provide additional evidence of correctness. An early version of the full assurance case for 3dfim+ can be found in Nejad 2017 [24, Appendix B] . Excerpts from the full case are given in Section 4. A brief overview of this work is provided in Smith et al 2018 [42] .
Besides providing a means to illustrate assurance cases for MIA, the 3dfim+ example provides an opportunity to justify the value of assurance cases for certification. Although no errors were found in the output of the existing software, the rigour of the proposed approach did lead to discovering ambiguities and omissions in the existing documentation. Moreover, the assurance case highlighted a potential safety concern when running the software itself. Most importantly, the explicit arguments and artifacts included in the assurance case provide evidence that can be independently judged for sufficiency. The specific evidence for the validation of assurance cases for MIA is given in Section 5, while the generalization of the approach for other SCS applications is presented in Section 6.
Overview of Assurance Cases
An assurance case is "[a] documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a specified set of critical claims about a system's properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given environment" [29, p. 5] .
The idea of assurance cases (or safety cases) began after a number of serious accidents, starting with the Windscale Nuclear Accident in the late 1950s. This incident was the United Kingdom's most serious nuclear power accident [26] and was instrumental in the government setting up new safety regulations incorporating assurance cases. Although there had not previously been an ignorance of safety concerns, and safety standards and regulatory approaches had been applied as the norm, the previous approaches proved to be insufficient. They lacked interaction between regulators and developers, especially since the developers were often more knowledgeable than the regulators about the safety of their products. Assurance cases (safety cases) do not just focus on verifying and validating the parts, but also on the interaction between the parts that may cause something unexpected to emerge.
Assurance cases have been widely used in the European safety community for over 20 years to ensure system safety [21] . They have been applied in industries such as aerospace, transportation, nuclear power, and defence [1] . Other examples include the energy sector, aviation infrastructure, aerospace vehicles, railways, automobiles, and medical devices, such as pacemakers, and infusion pumps [29] . Attempts have also been made to develop assurance cases in the security sectors [51] .
In North America, the medical domain is showing an increased interest in assurance cases. Safety cases are considered to have "the potential to support healthcare organizations in the implementation of structured and transparent systems for patient safety management" [6] . This potential is reflected in the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) strong recommendation that manufacturers submit a safety assurance case for any new infusion pumps [47] .
Safety cases, and in general assurance cases, require a clearly articulated argument, supported by evidence. An assurance case consists of a claim that we make about the properties of a product, that is then supported by subclaims that are eventually grounded in evidence derived from the product itself and its development.
For our work we have chosen the popular Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), developed by Kelly [22] to make our arguments clear, easy to read and, hence, easy to challenge. To develop the assurance case, we used Astah (http://astah.net/) to create and edit our GSN assurance cases. GSN starts with a Top Goal (Claim) that is then decomposed into Sub-Goals, and terminal Sub-Goals are supported by Solutions (Evidence). Strategies describe the rationale for decomposing a Goal or Sub-Goal into more detailed Sub-Goals. There are other constructs in GSN; a full overview, with examples, can be found in Sprigg's book [44] . Figure 1 shows what an assurance case might look like, using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) for goals, context and assumptions.
Focusing on the assurance case from the start of a project can improve the efficiency of the development process. SCS, such as MIA, is often subject to standardization An Assurance Case presents an argument that a system is acceptably safe, secure, reliable, etc. in a given context Where, a system could be physical or a combination of hardware and software. Based on the system goals identified in an Assurance Case, Assurance Case can also be referred as security case, dependability case, and safety case or by other relevant name as per goals applicability.
For better clarity, uses, critical engineering decisions and to ensure consistency, it is required to meet some minimum requirements for the contents and structure of an Assurance Case. These minimum requirements are specified by an International Standard ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011. To present an Assurance Case in a way to make it easy fo visualization, understanding and reviewing purpose, following Graphical notation tools are used Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Claims-Arguments-Evidence (CAE) CAE defines nodes for Claims, Arguments and Evidence whereas GSN uses goal oriented presentation style and defines nodes for Goals (claims), Strategy (arguments) and Solutions (evidence). Both these graphics notations ar mostly similar, with some difference of progression approach. GSN follows Top -Down approach while creating the Assurance Case starting with top level goal of the system where as CAE supports Bottom-UP view starting with evidence to determine the possible claim, while preparing Assurance Case [10] . There is no thumb rule as such to decide which approach should be followed, it can be decided by developers based on their choice and information available in hand before proceeding ahead with creating of Assurance Case. Arguments presented using GSN can help provide assurance of critical properties of systems, services or organizations (such as safety or security properties) Such arguments can form a key part of an overall assurance Case [11] . Refer figure 1 , which is showing the typica structure of an Assurance Case represented with Goal Structuring Notations.
Assurance Case in its simple form basically consists of following main components.
Claim or Goal:
This is generally some functionality, characteristics, requirement or behavior of the system that needs to be fulfilled. This can include all the essential requirements, functionalities and behavior of the system which is supposed to be met to ensure that system is fit for use. All the goals/claims are required to be supported by valid arguments based on valid evidences. The higher level goal/claim can be furthe Figure 1 : A basic GSN structure [11] and regulatory approval. While applying such approvals and standards has had a beneficial effect on system quality, it does not provide good tracking of the development stages, as the compliance with the standards are mostly checked after the system development. Once a system is implemented, its documentations must be approved by the regulators. This process is lengthy and expensive. In contrast, assurance case development should progress at least in parallel with the system construction (as recommended by the FDA [47] ), resulting in a traceable, detailed argument for the desired property (or properties). Moreover, assurance cases take a more direct, flexible and explicit approach. They are flexible enough to incorporate all existing assurance activities and artifacts in any step of the procedure. With the aid of a template and with experience, we believe that developing an assurance case does not necessarily require as much additional effort as people fear, and it potentially reduces costs, saves time and gives greater freedom in accommodating different standards.
Overview of 3dfim+
3dfim+ [49] is a tool in the Analysis of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) package (https://afni.nimh.nih. gov/). 3dfim+ analyzes the activity of the brain by computing the correlation between an ideal signal and the measured brain signal. The ideal signal is defined by the user. For instance, the ideal signal could be a square wave, as shown in Figure 2 . For ease of comparison, the corresponding value of the measured activity in Figure 2 is scaled between 0 and 1. This figures shows high correlation between ideal and measured signals. Figure 2 shows the ideal signal versus the brain activity for one voxel in the full 3D image of the brain. This analysis is completed for every voxel. The results can be visualized using the tools in the AFNI. Figure 3 shows the AFNI environment, in which we can see the brain from different perspectives with areas of high (negative and positive) correlation highlighted. As mentioned in Section 2, assurance cases are usually developed in parallel with the system construction. Given that 3dfim+ already exists, this was not an option for our current case study. This means that we had to be particularly vigilant to avoid problems with confirmation bias. We did not want to prove correctness of 3dfim+ with a flawed argument. Since we do not have a vested interest in the correctness of 3dfim+, this is less likely to be a problem than it might generally be. Our initial ignorance of the domain area also helps, since we acquired the domain knowledge in parallel with constructing the assurance case.
Assurance Case for 3dfim+
We have used the guidance provided in "General Principles of Software Validation; Final Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff" [4] to develop our assurance case. This guide outlines generally recognized validation principles that are FDA acceptable for the medical software validation. It was prepared by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) to provide globally harmonized principles concerning medical device software. The general principles document includes software, like 3dfim+, that is itself considered a medical device.
The presentation of the assurance case starts with an overview of assurance arguments using GSN. This is followed by summaries and excerpts from the evidence used to support the argument. The evidence includes the Software Requirements Specification (SRS), Test Cases, and Domain Expert Review.
Assurance Case
Our assurance case consists of many sub-claims, which means it cannot be represented legibly on a single page. Therefore, we will only include a representative subset of the argument, which has been split to separately show the sub-structures.
We have to label all parts of the assurance case structure, i.e. all goals, evidence, and contexts, so that our arguments can be discussed and reviewed unambiguously. A number of strategies exist to do this [44, p. 32-33] . For the ease of navigation, we prefer a hierarchical scheme; top goals in each sub-structure are labeled with a word or a letter but without a number (for example G) and then their sub-goals are labeled as G.1, G.2, ... and the subgoals of G.1 and G.2 are labeled, respectively, as G.1.1, G.1.2, ... and G.2.1 and G.2.2, ... and so on. The evidence is labeled in a similar way. Contexts, strategies, evidence and justifications are labeled alphabetically if more than one context, strategy or justification is used for an argument; for example, C Ga, C Gb, C Gc, ... for contexts and S Ga, S Gb, S Gc for strategies of the Goal G and so on.
When splitting a goal into its sub-goals, the rationale behind the choice of sub-goals is explained using strategies. In cases where the rationale is straightforward, it is excluded for space consideration. We have confined ourselves to traditional GSN, although we believe that GSN should be augmented to include reasoning, not just a strategy for decomposition. The original intent for assurance cases was to make the argument explicit. Without the reasoning that demonstrates that sub-goals act as premises for their parent goal, the argument remains implicit.
We have defined our top goal as "Program 3dfim+ delivers correct outputs when used for its intended use/purpose in its intended environment, and within its assumed operating assumptions." The truth of a claim depends on its context; therefore, we must be explicit about what we mean by each term in our goal statement. We could include the details with the goal statement itself, but then it would be too long and would lose its focus. The solution is to declare the context separately. We have defined each term in the top goal in several contexts. We have also made an assumption that the 3dfim+ will only be used for its intended purpose in its intended environment. The assumption and contexts are shown in Figure 4 .
As previously done for medical device assurance cases [50] , we have divided the top goal into four sub-goals, as shown in Figure 5 . The first sub-goal (GR) argues for the quality of the documentation of the requirements. To make an overall argument for correctness, we need a specification to judge correctness against. The second sub-goal (GI) says that the implementation complies with the requirements and the third sub-goal (GBA) states that, to the extent possible, the relevant operational assumptions have been identified. The fourth sub-goal GA also relates to assumptions, claiming that the inputs to 3dfim+ will satisfy the operational assumptions; we need valid input to make an argument for the correctness of the output. The strategy section of the GSN diagram presents the reasoning for decomposing the top-goal in this way: "If the requirements correctly and adequately describe the application to be built, and the implementation faithfully implements the requirements, then the only possibility that the application does not deliver correct outputs is if known or unknown assumptions are not met. These assumptions may relate to environmental conditions or usage. We thus have to consider whether we have adequately defined all relevant assumptions, and whether those assumptions are satisfied."
The top level of the assurance case in Figure 5 does not imply that up-front requirements are needed. This is fortunate, since scientists have the view that requirements are impossible to determine up-front, since they believe that details can only emerge as the work progresses [3, 34] . The assurance case needs requirements, but they can come out of the development process in any way appropriate for the developers. That is, the documentation can be "faked" like it is part of a rational design process [27] .
The main focus in our assurance case is arguing for GR (quality requirements). The decomposition of GR into its sub-goals is shown in Figure 6 . This decomposition is based on the IEEE standard 830-1993 [2] . This standard states that good documentation of requirements should be correct, unambiguous, complete, consistent, ranked for importance and/or stability, verifiable, modifiable and traceable (J GRa). Using the IEEE resource increases confidence in the argument and makes it more compelling. Our sub-goals address correctness, unambiguity, completeness, consistency, verifiability, modifiability and traceability of the requirements documentation. "Ranked for importance and/or stability" is excluded from the sub-goals in Figure 6 (as shown in J GRb) because our domain is MIA, where for the software to function properly, all requirements are considered of equal importance. This is shown as justification J GRb in Figure 6 .
The arguments for consistency, completeness, and cor-rectness were combined together in goal G 3C. These qualities were grouped because, according to some publications, such as " The Three Cs of Requirements: consistency, completeness, and correctness" [52] , there is an important relationship between completeness, consistency and correctness for software requirements. Improving one of these three qualities may diminish the others. From another perspective, correctness is a combination of consistency and completeness. So it is important to consider these 3 qualities together. The argument for completeness is partially based on the argument for the readiness of a business plan from Spriggs [44, p. 30] . Due to space limitations, the full details of this argument are not included here. They can be found in [24] . A sample expansion for the sub-goal of modifiability from GR ( Figure 6 ) is shown in Figure 7 . Modifiability is a quality attribute of the software architecture that relates to "the cost of change and refers to the ease with which a software system can accommodate changes" [25] . Modifiability generally requires the requirements documentation to have a coherent and easy-to-use organization with a table of contents, an index, and explicit cross-referencing. Moreover, requirements should not be redundant and they must be expressed separately. As for the other qualities, the argument for modifiability makes use of the generic evidence template (Figure 8 ) discussed below.
The content of the documentation of the requirements must be reviewed and verified by domain experts. This is particularly important in SCS because of the special role of assumptions. We cannot hope to develop models that include all of the complexities of the real world, so the adopted simplifying assumptions need to be judged for appropriateness. Spriggs [44, p. 37] gives a decomposition for arguments that end with domain expert review. We have developed a similar decomposition in our template modules, called GenericEvidence, as shown Figure 8 . Gener-icEvidence is a generic argument. The generic argument is often called a "pattern". "A pattern in this context is an argument that applies to a class of things, which you can use as the basis of an argument for a specific instance" [44, p. 103] . We have developed this module to re-use it for several arguments in our assurance case. We have an argument that a particular quality of the requirements documentation has been met; the main evidence items are the acceptance report and the addressed comments submitted by the reviewers. If we want to ensure that another quality has been met, we do not want to start our argument again from scratch. We prefer to use the same module (sub-structure), but bring in a new evaluation, comments and sections in the report as evidence. In that case, we can have the name of the quality in the module, but publish the argument stating exactly which quality is reviewed. For instance, for the sake of completeness, we verified that all statements made in the original documentation are reflected in the new documentation. This comparison is mentioned as GenericEvidence.3 in Figure 8 .
E GenericEvidence.1 in Figure 8 mentions the accep- tance criteria for reviewers' resumes. This information is included in the assurance case to mitigate against the bias problem mentioned in Section 2. Reviewers need to be qualified, and we should say what qualified means before we start looking for a reviewer. When we document the assurance case, we verify that the experts satisfy these criteria. If not, we have to make an argument why they should still be considered experts. This draws attention to the fact that there is something "unusual" here that may typically be overlooked. In Figure 5 we defined GA as "Inputs to 3dfim+ satisfies the defined operational assumptions." Achieving this goal partially relies on the software to check if the input is valid, but not all inputs can be validated by the software. The user of 3dfim+ also has responsibility, in the same sense that an automobile driver has responsibility to operate their vehicle safely. This argument for GA is shown in Figure 9 . This argument explicitly states that the user has responsibility for validating the input. The software can do automated checks, like verify that the measured activities are positive, but the software can never tell if 3dfim+ is the right tool for the job. For instance, the statistical model for 3dfim+ is parametric, if a non-parametric model would be more appropriate, the user will have to select another tool. Although not currently part of 3dfim+, we added a warning message, as part of the assurance case, that users be explicitly reminded of their responsibilities while running the software, similar to how movies or video games with flashing lights warn of the possibility of triggering seizures. Argument GA demonstrates the value of assurance cases requiring a complete argument. The responsibility of the user can easily be forgotten without an explicit coverage requirement to check that no cases are missing.
Software Requirements Specification
Having a Software Requirements Specification (SRS) is critical for software validation [4] . The requirements Figure 6 ) are documented in the SRS. This document is necessary to verify software correctness, since it provides a specification against which correctness can be judged. As a consequence, the SRS is mentioned in the sub-goals and evidence for several goals. For instance, in Figure 7 , for modifiability, the SRS is mentioned in goal Modifiable.1. Figure 8 for generic evidence references the SRS in E Generic Evidence.4, by calling for a requirements acceptance report. Goal GA (Figure 9 ) for the operational assumptions imposes several requirements on the SRS, such as in E GA.2, which mentions SRS content related to assumptions and data constraints.
Due to space limitations, only some representative excerpts from the SRS for 3dfim+ can be reproduced here. The excerpts selected are intended to give an overall feel for the document and to highlight some areas where the rigour of the assurance case provides benefits for the documentation and software quality. The full SRS is available in [24, Appendix A].
SRS Template
Writing an SRS generally starts with a template, which provides guidelines and rules for documenting the requirements. The assurance case supports the need for a template through the modifiability goal (Figure 7 ) Modifiable.1.1: "A standard/correct well-structured template has been followed." Several existing templates contain suggestions on how to avoid complications and how to achieve qualities such as verifiability, maintainability and reusability [10, 16, 23] . However, no template is universally accepted. For the MIA example, the choice was a template specifically designed for scientific software [39, 40] , as illustrated via the table of contents shown below. The recommended template is suitable for science, because of its hierarchical structure, which decomposes abstract goals to concrete instance models, through the support of data definitions, assumptions and terminology. The document's 
Goals
The high level objectives of the software are documented in the goals (Section 4.a.v of the SRS template shown in Section 4.2.1). A sample goal for 3dfim+ is: 
Assumptions
Assumptions (Section 4.b.i of the SRS template) highlight a simplification made for the purpose of the mathematical modelling. A significant responsibility of the SRS is to document the assumptions. As mentioned above, making the assumptions explicit facilitates expert review. Sample assumptions for 3dfim+ include:
A1: The variables should be either of type interval or ratio.
A2: There is a linear relationship between the two variables.
A3: The variables are bivariately normally distributed.
Theoretical Models
The theoretical models are sets of governing equations or axioms that are used to model the problem described in the problem definition section (SRS Section 4.b.ii). Traceability exists between the theoretical model and the other components of the documentation. For instance, the description for the T1 (Pearson Correlation Coefficient), which is given below, references the definition for mean (DD1) and several assumptions, including the three listed above.
Number T1
Label
Calculating Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Equation
Description The equation calculates Pearson correlation coefficients ρ applied to two datasets A : R n and B : R n both of size n.ā andb are sample means (DD1) of A and B, respectively. ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient between A and B. Assumptions A1-A5 must hold when calculating this correlation.
Coordinate Convention
Section 4.a.iii of the SRS documents describes the coordinate system for the fMRI images. This information is necessary to make the requirements unambiguous, since there are several choices for coordinate system for medical images. As an example, the SRS defines the Anatomical Coordinate System, which describes the standard anatomical position of a human being using 3 orthogonal planes: axial/transverse (plane parallel to the ground that separates the body into head (superior) and tail (inferior) positions), coronal/frontal (plane perpendicular to the ground Figure 9 : Argument for inputs satisfying the defined operational assumptions that divides the body into front (anterior) and back (posterior) positions), and sagittal/median (plane that divides the body into right and left positions. 3dfim+ uses NIfTI data files (https://nifti.nimh.nih.gov/) that store voxels from right to left to create rows, rows from anterior to posterior to create slices and slices from superior to inferior to create volumes. This information was only partially provided in the original documentation for 3dfim+.
Rank Function
Calculating the Spearman and Quadrant correlation coefficients [49] requires the use of the rank function. The original documentation for 3dfim+ had incomplete doc-umentation of the rank function. The rank function is defined in the SRS as a data definition.
The rank of data points is determined by sorting them in an ascending order and assigning a value according to their position in the sorted list. If ties exist, the average of all of the tied positions is calculated as the rank. Mathematically, the rank of element a in dataset A is defined as follows:
The above equations use the Gries and Schneider notation [13, p. 143] for set building and evaluation of an operator applied over a set of values. Specifically, the expression ( * x : X|R : P ) means application of the operator * to the values P for all x of type X for which range R is true. In the above equations, the * operators ∀, ∃ and + are used. Using this formal notation, we can ensure that cases are not left out in the documentation.
Test Cases
To verify the implementation of 3dfim+, we developed test cases based on the functional requirements documented in the SRS. The results of the test cases are used as evidence for goal GI (Figure 5 ), which argues that the implementation matches the SRS. Since our case study is for SCS, verification through testing is challenging. The source of the challenge is that SCS differs from most other software because the quantities of interest are continuous, as opposed to discrete. As shown for the calculation of the Pearson correlation coefficient (Section 4.2.4), the inputs and outputs are continuously valued real variables. Validating the requirements is difficult because there are an infinite number of potential input values, many of which cannot be represented as floating point numbers. In general for SCS, the correct value for the output variable is unknown. That is, SCS problems typically lack a test oracle [20] . Fortunately for this MIA example, 3dfim+, the correlation calculations are based on finite sets of real numbers, so constructing a pseudo oracle using Matlab was relatively straightforward.
We developed one Matlab test case per each functional requirement, to compare their results with the results of 3dfim+. As an example, we had a test case to check the correctness of the Pearson correlation coefficient, which is one of the main functionalities of 3dfim+. We used our Matlab pseudo oracle and AFNI to visualize the results and obtain the indices of voxels. Our input consisted of 180 frames of 64×64×28 images. In this test case, we found the minimum and the maximum Pearson correlation coefficients and their locations. For this test and others, we achieved the same results for both 3dfim+ and our independently developed Matlab script.
However, the testing was not without its challenges. Agreement between the Matlab pseudo oracle and 3dfim+ took a considerable amount of time to achieve, because the coordinate systems conventions for Matlab and AFNI are different. Since this information was not documented in the original 3dfim+ manual, we were unaware of this subtly. The coordinate system description for 3dfim+ was added to the SRS (as described in Section 4.2.5) after our struggles with achieving test case agreement.
In the case of 3dfim+ a pseudo oracle was available. For other MIA and SCS software, other techniques may be needed for the verification that the implementation matches the requirements [36] . Where appropriate, use can be made of the Method of Manufactured Solutions [30] and metamorphic testing [17] . For testing purposes, the slower, but guaranteed correct, interval arithmetic [15] can be used to ensure that calculated answers lie within the guaranteed bounds. Verification tests can also include plans for convergence studies. The discretization used in the numerical algorithm should be decreased (usually halved) and the change in the solution assessed. Although not used in the current example, verification can also use non-testing techniques, such as code walkthroughs, code inspections, and correctness proofs etc. [12, 48] .
Domain Expert Review
An important piece of evidence for an assurance case is the domain expert review. Review of the SRS is important to reach a common understanding between the software engineers and scientists. As mentioned in the introduction (Section 1), building an assurance case facilitates bridging the gap between software engineers and scientists. The domain expert also addresses the oracle problem outlined in the introduction. Since the correct answer is not known in general, an expert is needed to determine whether the testing and other evidence is sufficient for building sufficient confidence in the software.
Domain expert review appears in our assurance case as "Domain experts/customers approve the <quality> of the documentation of the requirements." This corresponds to GenericEvidence.2.3 in Figure 8 . To ensure our SRS is of high quality, a task-based inspection approach was used [18, 22] . For the review process we assigned a set of tasks asking questions about each section of the SRS. We used Github (https://github.com/) issue tracking for assigning the tasks and for discussion. Two sample review questions are reproduced below. A domain expert that completed the review for 3dfim+ has a degree in engineering and over 10 years experience in medical imaging. He therefore meets the acceptance criteria given in E GenericEvidence.1 in Figure 5 . The reviewer went through all the assigned tasks and provided answers/suggestions. For the most part, the SRS did not need to be modified as a result of the expert review. However, some of the symbols in the SRS, such as N for the set of natural numbers, were clarified as a result of the discussion with the expert reviewer.
The value of expert review is known in SCS. For instance, the High Energy Physics (HEP) software for the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) detector, which is part of the Large Hadron Collider, has a GitHub pull request process that involves automated testing, code quality checks and code review (http://cms-sw.github.io/PRWorkflow. html. This example is not unique in SCS. Applying such best practices contributes to building confidence. However, the reviews for the CMS software and for other SCS software are still often ad hoc. Questions like the following do not seem to be explicitly answered: What are the reviewer's qualifications? What software artifacts (code, documentation and test cases) are they reviewing? What issues/concerns are the reviewers checking? A review of the HEP community roadmap for future software and computing research and development is completely silent on the idea of formalizing the review process [45] . Informal reviews are certainly better than no reviews, but formal reviews have been demonstrated to be more effective. For instance, systematic code inspections of embedded software have a defect removal effectiveness of 85% [8] . Assurance cases answer the questions listed above; they make the review requirements rigorous and defendable. Moreover, building an assurance case, like the one for 3dfim+, shows explicitly that the code is not the only work product. The design, test plan, requirements etc., should also be reviewed. As the domain expert review highlights, the techniques for building confidence are already employed in SCS; the shift to using assurance cases just means telling a more complete and compelling story.
Validation of Assurance Case Approach
The 3dfim+ case study provides evidence of the suitability of assurance cases for SCS. Although the original software was certainly built with care, problems were still uncovered as a consequence of the systematic and rigorous process of building a complete and defendable argument for correctness. The need for documentation, review and testing not only provides a means to improve the software, it provides as a byproduct an explicit argument for correctness that can be verified/replicated by third parties.
Before summarizing the assurance case improvements to 3dfim+, we should note that we are not criticizing the original 3dfim+ software and its documentation. The goal of the assurance case is to provide certifiable software, but the original software did not have this goal. It was written for researchers, not for clinicians. The users for 3dfim+ and readers of its documentation are likely to be domain experts. However, even for the existing audience for 3dfim+, there will likely be some novices. The improvements noted below would likely interest new users, since the new documentation is more complete and less ambiguous than the original. This benefit of improving software and its documentation is also observed when retroactively writing an SRS for nuclear safety analysis software [38] .
Given the different audience that was envisioned, the original documentation would not satisfy the GR goal (Figure 6) for high quality requirements. The existing documentation is not fully complete, unambiguous, correct, consistent, verifiable, modifiable or traceable. One of the main ambiguities is through the absence of documentation on the coordinate system (Section 4.2.5). As mentioned previously, the absence of any specification related to the coordinate system meant that comparing the 3dfim+ results to an independent calculation of the correlation was difficult. Additional investigation was necessary to find the necessary details so that both results were expressed in the same coordinate system. Another ambiguity, due to incomplete documentation, was for the definition of the rank function (Section 4.2.6). In the original documentation the specific definition of the rank function is not given. This creates ambiguity when there are ties in the data because there are multiple ways to deal with ties. For instance, all ties could be given the same rank, and then a gap could be left in the ranking numbers. Alternatively, ties could get the same rank, but no gap could be included before listing the next ranking number. Five different ranking algorithms can be found on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranking. The one actually used by 3dfim+ gives the same ranking number to all ties, with the rank being equal to the mean of what they would have under ordinal ranking. This fact was not determined from the documentation, but by investigating the C code implementation of 3dfim+. The C code is the basis for the specification given in Section 4.2.6.
Although the software for 3dfim+ did not show any errors in its output, some subtle concerns were raised by considering the assurance case GA for satisfying the operational assumptions (Figure 9 ). As shown in GA.1, 3dfim+ should not proceed if the input does not match the necessary assumptions. However, the actual software does not check the input data. GA.2 ("User is aware of what inputs are valid") is also not considered for 3dfim+. The input assumptions are not made explicit in the documentation and the user is not warned that it is their responsibility to provide valid data. As mentioned previously, the user has the responsibility of determining whether the statistical model used by 3dfim+ provides the right tool for them. The need for an explicit warning highlights a significant benefit of the assurance case methodology -building an assurance case forces the developers to ask questions that they might not otherwise ask. We would likely not have addressed "how does a user know the inputs are valid?" if the methodology had not forced us to build an argument that the inputs satisfy the defined operational assumptions (Figure 9 ).
Further evidence for the validity of applying assurance cases to SCS is the success they have found for real time safety critical systems [29, 31, 50] . From the perspective of assurance cases, SCS and real-time systems are not that different. Both domains require the qualities of correctness and reliability. For qualities where specific examples may differ in importance, such as the quality of portability, the general approach of building an assurance case is the same, no matter the quality. The specific differences for different qualities will be in terms of the arguments and the evidence, not in the overall approach. In terms of the relationship between developers, domain experts and regulators, the motivating argument described at the beginning of this paper will usually apply equally to SCS and real time software. That is, in both cases, the regulators will likely have less expert knowledge than the developers, which implies that the case for building an argument for quality should be in the hands of the developers. If assurance cases are suitable for real-time systems, then they are at least as suitable for SCS, since SCS is arguably simpler than real-time software. SCS does not generally have the same complexities in the external environment, nor the same number of hazards, or concerns with emergent behaviour from the interaction of multiple systems.
Generalization of Approach and Future Work
Our example has focused on MIA, specifically 3dfim+, but generalizing the assurance case approach to other SCS applications is straightforward. Most of the developed assurance case is not medical imaging specific, as illustrated by the following points:
• The top level goal ( Figure 5 ) can be viewed as generic if it is parameterized by the software name. That is, the name 3dfim+ could be replaced with any other SCS software application and the argument at this level would be unchanged. This is not surprising as this top level itself was borrowed from an assurance case for medical devices [50] .
• The context and assumptions for the top goal (Figure 4) would change for different SCS applications, but the type of questions to answer for the context would be similar, such as "what is the intended functionality of the software?", "what is the intended software environment?" etc.
• The argument for the required qualities of the requirements is based on the IEEE standard, which allows decomposition of the quality concerns into arguments for correctness, completeness, consistency, unambiguity, verifiability, modifiability and traceability ( Figure 6 ). The IEEE standard is intended to apply to all software, not just medical imaging, or SCS.
• The arguments for modifiability, generic evidence and operational assumptions (Figures 7, 8 and 9 , respectively) could be used as a starting point for other examples. The main difference will be in the required evidence.
• The SRS template adopted for the requirements is not specific to MIA; it was developed for SCS in general and has been applied to cases such as thermal analysis of a nuclear fuel pin [38] , mesh generation [43] , and others [37] .
The need for building confidence in scientific software is not unique to medical imaging analysis software, there are many cases where we need assurance, such as for nuclear safety, computational medicine, climate modelling, etc. The verification of other scientific software, that provides the evidence at the bottom of the assurance case, will likely vary from one problem to the next. However, the tools and techniques for verification on scientific software already exist; they do not need to be invented. What is needed is a push to the scientific software developers to use the existing techniques and document their results so that others can build confidence in the software. An expectation of supplying an assurance case could provide this push.
Based on the current work and our review of past work on assurance cases, we have identified a number of directions for the future development of assurance cases, as follows:
• Additional Examples to Create a Template: As mentioned above, there are significant commonalities between SCS problems and predictable variabilities. Recording this information would make the creation of new assurance cases easier. Since testing was relatively easy for 3dfim+, further exploration will be necessary for testing options, like the strategies mentioned in Section 4.3.
• Build an Assurance Case for a Family of SCS Programs: Implicit in the previous discussion is that we have a single SCS program to build an assurance case, but in many situations, we are interested in a family of related SCS programs [41] , such as a family of linear solvers or ODE solvers. In this case, we would investigate whether we should build an assurance case for the family, or a family of assurance cases?
• Work on the Assurance Case from the Start: The current work produced the assurance case, SRS and test plan a posteriori. As mentioned in Section 2, assurance cases work best when they are used from the start of a project. A particular benefit for research purposes will be a likely increase in the workload that can be assigned to domain reviewers, since they will likely have a greater vested interest in the success of the project than when it is a purely academic exercise.
• Tool Support Improvement: Currently, there is no tool that provides an abstraction of goals and subgoals to handle the complexity of the assurance case structure. For instance, it would be nice to hide the details of a goal (or a context, justification, evidence or assumption) and only show the title. This would improve readability. Details could be revealed via clicking on the goals, or context etc.
• Publishing Examples of Practical Assurance Cases: Currently, many existing assurance cases are not released due to proprietary rights. The more presentations on adoption of assurance cases and case studies, the better resources we have to learn about assurance cases.
• Adding Formality to Assurance Cases: The means of expressing confidence in assurance cases and the toplevel claims may benefit from further formality and rigour, as presented in [7] . Adding formality could justify the completeness and consistency of claim decomposition and the credibility of the evidence. A formal model will help, even if not all evidence will be mathematical. The formal model will show the ideal situation and will clarify all of the requirements for a complete assurance case, even if some of the evidence itself has to be informal.
Concluding Remarks
This work has motivated assurance cases for SCS. Assurance cases have already been effectively used for safety cases for real time systems. For SCS their advantages include engaging domain experts, producing only necessary documentation, and providing evidence that can potentially be verified/replicated by a third party. The engagement of the domain experts is noteworthy because scientist end user developers have historically shown a distrust of software engineering techniques and principles. In particular, SCS developers tend not to favour full documentation of requirements. However, their motivation should improve because an assurance case shows the necessity and value of an SRS. As more examples and tools become available, adoption of assurance cases in SCS in general, and for the specific example of MIA, should become more prevalent. The FDA already strongly advises assurance cases for newly developed infusion pumps [47] .
How to document an assurance case for SCS was illustrated via the MIA example of the medical image analysis software, 3dfim+. The 3dfim+ software analyzes activity in the brain by computing the correlation between the measured and an ideal brain signal. This example was partly chosen because of recent concerns about the validity of fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) studies. The concerns centre around whether a parametric model is appropriate for fMRI data. Although the software itself cannot determine whether it is the appropriate model, the user should ask themselves this question. The assurance case highlighted how the user can be informed of the mathematical assumptions of the model through the SRS, and the details of their responsibility through in-program warnings.
The value of assurance cases for MIA was justified. Although no errors were found in the software outputs from 3dfim+, the exercise did highlight problems with the original documentation and software. The existing documentation was shown to have ambiguities and omissions, such as an incompletely defined ranking function and missing details on the coordinate system convention adopted. In addition, a potential concern for the software itself was identified. As mentioned above, running the software does not produce any warning about the obligation of the user to provide data that matches the parametric statistical model employed for the correlation calculations. Further evidence for the validity of applying assurance cases to SCS is the success they have found for real time safety critical systems. From the perspective of assurance cases, SCS and real-time systems have much in common, with SCS generally having the advantage of a operating within a simpler environment.
Our example has focused on MIA, but generalizing the assurance case approach to other SCS applications is straightforward. Each of the assurance case diagrams shown had mostly generic content. The main place where the examples become specific are at the bottom of the argument, where the evidence is presented. Although the evidence will be problem specific, the type of evidence needed, like test reports, domain expert resumes, etc, will be similar between problems.
Although a concerted effort was made to make the assurance case for 3dfim+ convincing and complete, the specific argument for 3dfim+ is not the point of this paper. The important revelation about assurance cases is that they are for communication, between experts, especially experts in different domains. They make what was previously implicit, explicit. They force developers to ask questions that they might not otherwise ask. Is the evidence complete? Do we have an explicit argument that nothing important has been missed? Much of the needed evidence (test cases, expert reviews, etc) for an assurance case, with the usual exception of requirements documentation, is already produced when developing SCS. The evidence is generally presented in an ad hoc way. With assurance cases, a third party does not have to use incomplete evidence to form an opinion on the quality of a given work, they can use the full story, and judge whether the story is convincing. If a reviewer disagrees, they can point to the portion of the argument that they feel is weak, and the developers will have an opportunity to strengthen their argument.
The developed assurance case relies on the presence of requirements documentation. However, many in the SCS community believe that upfront requirements are impossible, or at least infeasible [35] . As a consequence of this view, requirements are rarely explicitly recorded for SCS. Can a convincing assurance case for correctness be produced without requirements documentation as part of the evidence? We do not believe so, since verification exercises, like testing, require an explicit objective against which the results can be judged. However, we leave the challenge of producing a requirements document free assurance case open to the SCS community.
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